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In this anno Domini when Eastern and Central Europe are
so much in the news, one hears little about Yugoslavia. Part
of the explanation for this curious fact is, no doubt, the
great complexity of the situation in this heterogeneous
country in which even the landscape is noted for its variety.
You will easily understand my own sense of despair, then, in
having learned that I have to encapsulate my report in a five-
minute presentation. To make matters worse, my predeces-
sors have lain so many Eastern-European problems bare
that the boredom mentioned in connection with· the third
stage of the "velvet revolution" may at this point already
have set in. I shall therefore limit myself to making only a
few remarks about the Yugoslav political situation, a theme
whose tedium factor is somewhat lower than that of my spe-
cialty-the legal system.
You will remember that Yugoslavia was the enfant terrible
of world communism, infecting it with Titoist heresy in the
fifties. For several ensuing decades it was the darling of the
State Department, and also the darling of ordinary Eastern
Europeans. As Eastern Europeans on this panel will readily
attest, they were happy if the could obtain a permit from
their government to travel to this half-way house to the
West, or if they could purchase in their own countries Yugo-
slav consumer goods or other simulacra of things from the
free West. All this has changed of late, or is in the process
of changing. Most countries of the former Eastern Bloc
have caught up with or overtaken Yugoslavia (to the extent
that you can generalize about its constituent republics). in
dismantling communist institutions, discarding communist
practices, attracting foreign investors, and capturing the im-
agination of intellectuals. and publicists in the West. What
has happened to the land of Southern Slavs (for this is what
Yugoslavia means) on its journey from Bolshevism to
democracy?
From an array of interacting reasons two deserve to be
singled out because they are either ignored or misunder-
stood in the United States. The first reason is that there was
much less to rebel against in Yugoslavia than in other East-
ern European countries when the turbulent year 1989 came
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around. The second is the maze of ethnic rivalries which
created after Tito's death a sort of self-canceling Brownian
motion and prevented concerted action in any direction.
.Why was there less to rebel against than in the rest of
Eastern Europe? In the fifties Yugoslav communists inaugu-
rated a special brand of socialism along Proudhonian
anarcho-syndicalist lines. Rigid central planning and even
state ownership of industrial plants were abolished.
Although the Party continued to pull the strings in the back-
ground, it retreated from many spheres of social life, and
the totalitarian grip was greatly relaxed. Mter the boss of
the secret police was ousted in the late sixties, an exuberant
movement toward greater freedom was set in motion by
pragmatic and relatively liberal communist leaders in almost
all Yugoslav republics. For example, the Slovenian leader-
ship seriously considered setting up a "socialist" stock-ex-
change. Even people, like myself, who refused to join the
Party were entrusted with responsible positions in govern-
ment, industry, and academic life. It is also worth mention-
ing that a system ofjudicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes was created in this period for the purpose of resolv-
ing problems arising from considerable fragmentation of
governmental power. (I remember the first President of the
Constitutional Court telling me on one occasion that his
court will be a cohesive force after Tito's death.)
In the early seventies Tito suddenly turned against cham-
pions of "socialism with the human face," but even after he
placed the more dogmatic communists back in power, the
country was still relatively relaxed, open to the West, and
economically in better shape than the Comecon countries.
Consider only that two constitutional amendments in the
late eighties permitted individuals to own "means of pro-
duction" such as industrial plants, business buildings, and
productive capital of all sorts. Foreigners were permitted to
invest not only in joint ventures, but also-if they were ad-
venturous enough-to open up their own industrial plants.
All told, when the miraculous year 1989 ushered in the
demise of orthodox communism in Eastern Europe, there
was much less pressure in Yugoslavia than in the rest of
Eastern Europe towards greater freedom. Economic re-
forms were conceived in a somewhat different context too.
To "privatize" industry, for example, rang differently in a
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system of state firms ttJ,an in a setting of self-managing ide-
ology and considerable self-managing practice. Nor should
it be forgotten that the party, albeit far from loved, was
much less discredited than in most Eastern European coun-
tries. Yugoslav communists were not installed in power by
Soviet troops, but successfully led a guerilla army which lib-
erated Yugoslavia from the Nazis. Small wonder, then, that
the siren calls of both "glasnost" and "perestroika" were
less alluring and less irresistible.
Better known but unfathomable to most Americans is the
second reason that caused Yugoslavia to lose its leadership
in the movement away from Bolshevism in Eastern Europe.
It is the explosive rivalry among its constituent nations, an
issue to which another panel will address itself later this
morning. In the few minutes at my disposal I can do no
more than propose a metaphor that might suggest to Ameri-
cans the dimensions of this tragic problem. Imagine, then,
in lieu of the land of Southern Slavs, the unlikely country of
Northern Semites, comprising Lebanon, Israel, and Syria.
Imagine further that this political unit was created by the
Syrians, who dominate the armed forces and the govern-
mental bureaucracy. The capital is in Damascus. Now ask
yourself whether it is surprising that all sorts of conflicts
would arise in this state, and that some ethnic groups would
want dissolution of this rocky political marriage?
Similarly with Yugoslavia. The country was created on
the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy as an ex-
tension of the old Kingdom of Serbia. To the disappoint-
ment of various ethnic groups incorporated into the new
political unit, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was ruled from
Belgrade by the Serbs, of whom many came to identify the
Yugoslav idea with that of Great Serbia. Sensitive to ethnic
issues and drawing lessons from the carnage of the Second
World War, Tito decided to set up a federal structure for
communist Yugoslavia. But this was not the federal struc-
ture known to Americans, where the "neutral" District of
Columbia is the geographical locus of power. Instead, the
capital remained in Serbia, and Serbs continued (albeit to a
lesser degree) to dominate the federal bureaucracy and the
Army, notwithstanding serious attempts to establish a quota
system for Croats, Slovenes, and others.
Naive communist dreams that the new Yugoslav society
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would be free of nationalist passion were soon disciplined
by reality, and what prevented these passions from surfacing
with great force much earlier was mainly Tito's firm grip on
power and his manipulative skills. To an extent, also,
Yugoslavs realized that-with all their troubles-they were
better off than other Eastern Europeans, and that their in-
ternal squabbles might bring about Soviet intervention.
With Tito gone, the economic situation deteriorating, and
the threat of Soviet intervention receding, no wonder that
the nationality issues exploded into the open with great
force. Unfortunately, old conflicts have gained a new polit-
ical dimension. Wrapping themselves into the cause of Ser-
bian nationalism, Serbian communists survived free
elections while communists in other Republics were ousted.
As a result, the division between communist and democratic
regions has been added to old issues dividing the land.
In this tense and dangerous situation, with the threat of
civil war hanging over the land, the immediate and vital
question of whether to preserve the rocky marriage of di-
verse ethnic groups almost totally silenced talk about
needed economic, political, and even spiritual renewal. And
so it came to pass, you see, that Yugoslavia lost its position
of experimenter and leader in seeking ways to replace the
odious combination of red tape and red rule that character-
izes Bolshevism.
Let me end by saying that Yugoslavia may soon make the
news again, but for deeply disturbing reasons. What would
probably be best for all Yugoslavs concerned would be to
agree to a temporary separation in the form of a loose con-
federation of states. With desire for independence thus sat-
isfied, and with economic realities pressing for larger
integration, there would then be a chance at a genuinely fair
federation-a new marriage. Unfortunately, I do not be-
lieve that Serbs would consent to such a separation--even if
temporary-unless permitted to change borders and create
a Great Serbia on the ruins of Yugoslavia. What is then
most likely to occur is the newsworthy violence! Soon you
might read about civil war over territory claimed by Serbia
from seceding Republics, or about a bloody putsch of elite
Army units carried out to preserve Yugoslavia. And because
the Army is a stronghold of dogmatic communists and dom-
inated by a single ethnic group, the prospect for this third
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Yugoslavia to satisfy the aspirations of its many ethnic
groups would not be much brighter than those of the pre-
ceding two. I end by voicing my ardent hope that my pre-
diction is wrong.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
BENNETT: Well, as you see, the law works only imper-
fectly. It works largely by hovering over the situation rather
than by clamping down, and it works through the coopera-
tion and goodwill of those subject to it. But in the end, even
if imperfect, it really has quite marvelous results.
QUESTION: I would like to ask a question of the Soviet
representative. What, if anything, is the prospect for direct
election of the president as a part of the legal constitutional
development in the Soviet Union?
LUSHIKOV: At the forthcoming congress of the peoples
deputies, we intend to adopt a law on referendums. Only
after adopting that law can the question of direct election of
the leaders of the government be raised. But we are still
critical of this idea. We have learned how to elect in our
state; it would be good if we learned how to work like that.
QUESTION: When is it exactly that the people in the So-
viet Union learned to elect government leaders?
LUSHIKOV: I simply wanted to acknowledge the break-
through that has happened. We are carrying out one elec-
tion campaign after another that has quite politized our
society, but the implementation of economic reforms is lag-
ging behind. That is the essence of our current problems.
QUESTION: I want to pick up on Judge Kozinski's point
that the situation in Romania is indeed bleak. It strikes me
that it is bleak for a reason that the panel has not yet
touched upon, namely, the understanding of how markets,
democracies, and governments work is relatively primitive
in all of these countries, with certain notable exceptions.
The reason is there has been such a paucity of publications
and availability ofliterature on this subject for years. That is
what is changing. Even in Romania, that is what is exciting.
They are publishing works that were for forty years
unavailable.
